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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Jurisdiction,” it has been bemoaned, “is a word of many, too many, 
meanings.”1  For some, it means nothing more than any other authorization 
or limit.2  For others, the term denotes something more fundamental and 
 ∗  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.  Thanks to Kimberly Brown, Paul Carrington, 
Mark Graber, Alex Lees, Brian W. Portugal, Philip Pucillo, Steve Sheppard, Gordon Silverstein, and 
Howard Wasserman for comments on prior drafts.  This Article was presented at the Southeastern Asso-
ciation of Law Schools annual conference in August 2007. 
1  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2  See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1613–14, 
1620 (2003) (arguing that there is no conceptual difference between jurisdiction and merits because both 
deal with demarcating the legitimate authority of a court). 
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represents the legitimate power of a court.3  The latter is the traditional 
view,4 and the Supreme Court has long adhered to it.5 
The classification of statutes as jurisdictional or procedural—what this 
Article calls “jurisdictional characterization”—has important consequences 
for litigants.  Questions of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, unlike 
merits questions or procedural irregularities, can be raised by any party or 
the court sua sponte; may not be consented to by the parties; are not subject 
to principles of estoppel, forfeiture, or waiver; and may be raised at any 
time, including for the first time on appeal.6  In the common first-year civil 
procedure case of Capron v. Van Noorden,7 for example, the Supreme 
Court, on an appeal by the plaintiff, reversed a judgment against the plain-
tiff for lack of diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to allege 
his own diverse citizenship.8 
Of additional importance for my purposes here, the distinction has spe-
cific statutory implications in the removal context.  If a federal district court 
determines at any time prior to final judgment that it lacks subject matter ju-
risdiction over a removed case, the case must be remanded.9  Nonjurisdic-
tional defects in removal, however, must be raised within thirty days of 
removal or are forfeited.10  This particular feature of removal pressures 
plaintiffs who prefer to litigate in state court to discover procedural defects 
in removal quickly, as opposed to jurisdictional defects, which can be raised 
at a later stage. 
Thus, whether a particular question is jurisdictional or not means a 
great deal.  The problem is that determining whether a particular issue is ju-
risdictional is often difficult.  And the ubiquitous and somewhat careless  
 
 
3  See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate 
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22 (1981) (“The concept of subject-matter 
jurisdiction in our legal system refers to the motive force of a court, the root power to adjudicate a speci-
fied set of controversies.”). 
4  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 551 n.* (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stating 
that jurisdiction is the power of “speaking or pronouncing . . . the law”). 
5  See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (defining jurisdiction as “the power 
of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject”); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 
(1917) (Holmes, J.) (“The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . .”); Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.  Ju-
risdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the 
court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”). 
6  See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).  
7  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804). 
8  Id. at 126–27. 
9  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000). 
10  Id. 
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use of the term jurisdictional by the Supreme Court and lower courts11 has 
spawned confusion over what is and is not jurisdictional.12 
Perhaps partly in response to this confusion, the Court, in recent years, 
has begun resolving jurisdictional characterization issues outside the re-
moval context.  For example, the Court has held that the time to file a notice 
of appeal is jurisdictional,13 whereas generic time bars in rules promulgated 
under the Rules Enabling Act14 or in substantive statutes are not jurisdic-
tional.15  The Court also has held that the definition of “employer” in Ti-
tle VII is an element of proof of the substantive claim rather than a 
jurisdictional condition.16 
The Court’s clarifications in these areas, however, do not extend com-
fortably to the removal statutes.17  Unlike the time limit for filing a notice of 
appeal, the removal provisions are a convoluted scheme that lacks a single, 
uniform historical pedigree of consistent jurisdictional treatment.18  Unlike 
the Federal Rules, the removal statutes are not constrained by the limita-
 
11  Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 n.2 (2007) (criticizing “this Court’s past careless use of 
[jurisdictional] terminology. . .”); id. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“This variety of [jurisdictional] 
meaning has insidiously tempted courts, this one included, to engage in less than meticulous, sometimes 
even profligate use of the term.” (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted)); Sinochem 
Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2007) (admitting that phrases from prior 
precedent using the term “jurisdiction” were “less than felicitously crafted” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (confessing that federal courts, itself in-
cluded, had “sometimes been profligate in its use of the term [jurisdictional]”); Eberhart v. United 
States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam) (noting that the lower court’s improper characterization of a 
federal rule as jurisdictional “is an error shared among the circuits, and that it was caused in large part 
by imprecision in our prior cases”); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (“Courts, including this 
Court, it is true, have been less than meticulous . . . ; they have more than occasionally used the term ‘ju-
risdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court.”). 
12  For discussions of the lower court confusion over the jurisdictional characterization of certain is-
sues, see generally Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the jurisdictional characterization of deadlines); Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdic-
tional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399 (1986) (discussing the jurisdictional characteri-
zation of the time to appeal); Philip A. Pucillo, Rescuing Rule 3(c) from the 800-Pound Gorilla: The 
Case for a No-Nonsense Approach to Defective Notices of Appeal, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 271 (2006) (dis-
cussing the jurisdictional characterization of the contents of a notice of appeal); Howard M. Wasserman, 
Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005) (discussing the distinctions between jurisdic-
tional elements of a statute and merits elements); Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and 
Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457 (2006) (addressing jurisdictional characterization issues generally). 
13  See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.  
14  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
15  See Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 13; Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 414 (2004); Kontrick, 540 
U.S. at 454–55; Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).  For more detail on the 
reasoning in these and other non-removal cases, see infra text accompanying notes 94–118. 
16  See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515. 
17  I use the term “removal statutes” generically.  There is a general removal statute found in 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1441–47 (2000).  There also are additional rights of removal or prohibitions of removal speci-
fied in narrower circumstances.  The term “removal statutes” refers to all of these provisions. 
18  See infra text accompanying notes 124–27. 
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tions in the Rules Enabling Act, but rather are themselves quasi-
jurisdictional.19  Unlike time bars, statutes of limitations, and merits ele-
ments, which generally run with the substantive merits or are tied to histori-
cal considerations of equity, the removal statutes generally are not tied to 
the merits of a claim and implicate significant federalism concerns.20  In ad-
dition, the characterization of removal provisions contains a unique conse-
quence: all defects in removal other than a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction must be raised within thirty days of removal or be forfeited.21 
In short, the Court’s recent pronouncements in these specific areas do 
not answer conclusively the jurisdictional characterization issues in the re-
moval statutes.  Yet the Court continues to avoid addressing the removal is-
sues.  Indeed, earlier this year, the Court denied certiorari in a case that 
would have addressed a jurisdictional characterization issue in the removal 
statute22—the “forum defendant rule,” the very issue that I showcase later in 
this Article. 
In light of the confusion that still surrounds removal characterization 
issues, the Court’s failure to address them, and the critical practical effects 
they have for litigants and the judicial system, now is the time to start de-
veloping a methodical, reasoned framework for resolving the complicated 
characterization issues in removal.  Beginning a conversation about that de-
velopment and laying some initial groundwork is the modest task of this 
Article. 
In this first Part, I have introduced the problem of jurisdictional charac-
terizations and the specific jurisdictional and procedural character of the 
removal statutes.  In Part II, I take a close look at the removal statutes and 
describe select portions that reasonably could be described as either juris-
dictional or procedural, setting the stage for the later analysis.  Part III me-
thodically develops a framework for tackling the characterization issues in 
the removal statutes, synthesized from previous clarifications and modified 
to account for the quasi-jurisdictional nature of removal and its implications 
for federalism.  I intend it to be the initial groundwork for resolving these 
issues and to invite additional discussion.  In that spirit, Part IV uses the 
“forum defendant rule” of § 1441(b) as a case study for demonstrating how 
the initial framework developed in Part III provides a more reasoned basis 
for resolving the jurisdictional characterization issues than the confused ap-
proaches taken by the courts of appeals.  Finally, in Part V, I conclude with 
some additional thoughts for the future, including how my framework 
 
19  See infra text accompanying notes 105–12. 
20  See infra text accompanying notes 76–93. 
21  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
22  See Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1265 (2007).  In the interest of full disclosure, I 
was one of the attorneys assisting Ms. Lively on her petition for certiorari, along with Jeff Fisher and 
Pam Karlan of Stanford Law School (Supreme Court Litigation Clinic), Amy Howe of Howe & Russell, 
P.C., and Lenny Tavera of Lowle, Denison, Smith & Tavera, LLP. 
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might affect jurisdictional questions that are currently debated, as well as 
others that have yet to be confronted. 
II. FRAMING JURISDICTIONAL CHARACTERIZATIONS 
A discussion of the characterization issues in the removal statutes can-
not begin without a primer on jurisdiction and a summary of the removal 
statutes. 
A. A Primer on Jurisdiction 
As a formal matter, jurisdiction is the power or authority of a court to 
issue legitimate, binding, and enforceable orders.  Procedure is the regula-
tion of that power or authority once obtained.  These concepts are not al-
ways simple to separate, and, as Evan Tsen Lee argues, may be analytically 
indistinguishable.23  Nevertheless, as Perry Dane has stated, “Law is a world 
of words.  Law also depends upon a singular confidence in the power of 
words. . . .  [One aspect] is its belief that legal ideas and categories are real 
things,”24 such as, in his words, “[t]he Idea of Jurisdiction.”25  That is, a 
separation of jurisdiction from nonjurisdiction matters—even Lee acknowl-
edges that that historical distinction, whether a true distinction or not, is in-
delible26—and thus the historical differences between what is jurisdictional 
and what is not must drive the inquiry. 
As “power,” jurisdiction embodies societal values, such as federalism, 
separation of powers, and a limited national government.27  All are relevant 
to removal.  With respect to federalism, removal takes a case properly filed 
in state court away from state authority, ending that state authority abruptly 
and without recourse from the state, and places the case under the authority 
of a federal court.28  With respect to separation of powers, removal reflects 
 
23  See Lee, supra note 2, at 1614–15 (outlining the argument that “jurisdiction is conceptually indis-
tinct from the merits”). 
24  Dane, supra note 12, at 3. 
25  Id. at 21; see also Lees, supra note 12, at 1461 (suggesting that the term can be used expressively 
to emphasize clear divisions between law-speaking institutions).  
26  Lee, supra note 2, at 1628 (noting that “[c]enturies of Anglo-American jurisprudence” have relied 
on “something called ‘jurisdiction’” and that abolishing the jurisdictional doctrines would undermine 
“[t]he relative consensus underlying the legal order”). 
27  See Dane, supra note 12, at 36–37 (“Commentators sometimes say that parties cannot control ju-
risdictional issues because jurisdictional rules embody societal interests that go beyond the interests of 
the parties and that none of the parties might have an adequate incentive to advance.  For example, both 
parties to a lawsuit might prefer their case to be heard in a fast, efficient, clean federal court [rather] than 
in a slow, clumsy, dingy state court.  But the larger social interest in federalism might dictate other-
wise.”); Hall, supra note 12, at 423 (referencing “important political principles that underlie the jurisdic-
tional limits in a federal system”); see also Lees, supra note 12, at 1460 (proposing reserving 
“jurisdictional” for those limits that divide authority between law-speaking institutions, such as state and 
federal courts, the judiciary and the other branches, or trial and appellate courts). 
28  See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–47 (2000). 
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the authority of Congress under Article III to control the jurisdiction of the 
lower courts.29  And, with respect to a limited national government, removal 
broadens the scope of federal authority at the expense of state courts of 
competent jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s choice of forum. 
Procedure, on the other hand, is regulation of a court’s lawful exercise 
of power.  Procedure deals not with whether but with how.  In contrast to 
the jurisdictional separation of authority among institutions, procedure 
serves the largely litigant and systematic values of efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, autonomy, predictability, and fairness.  It is true that, in serv-
ing litigant values, procedural rules also promote broader societal values, 
but these generally are secondary effects of the procedural rules.30 
Jurisdiction and procedure have functional differences as well.  Defects 
in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited, waived, or consented to; 
they are not subject to principles of estoppel; and they can be raised at any 
time and by any party, including a court sua sponte.31  Procedural defects, 
on the other hand, usually are waivable, may be avoided, and are the sole 
responsibility of the litigants.  In the removal context, the distinction has a 
statutory effect: procedural defects must be raised in a motion to remand 
within thirty days after removal or they are waived.32 
One of the reasons for the functional differences is that the adversarial 
process relies on litigants to assert those procedural rights or values that 
they deem worthy to raise, thereby promoting judicial efficiency by requir-
ing resolution of only those issues deemed worthy of decision by the par-
ties.33  Jurisdictional rules, on the other hand, protect the larger societal 
interests discussed above, even when they are not deemed worthy of protec-
tion by the litigants.34  As Perry Dane has put it, “both parties to a lawsuit 
might prefer their case to be heard in a fast, efficient, clean federal court 
[rather] than in a slow, clumsy, dingy state court.  But the larger social in-
terest in federalism might dictate otherwise.”35 
Another reason for the functional differences is that the values served 
by the procedural rules may not be promoted by strict application of the 
procedural rules and, indeed, may be hindered in certain situations by their 
strict application.  If the procedural rule in question is designed to promote 
fairness or equitable administration, then it is reasonable to allow courts to 
bend or break the procedural rules in certain cases when equity or fairness 
demands it. 
 
29  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
30  See Lees, supra note 12, at 1488 (“Those broad societal ends are ancillary concerns of [proce-
dural] rules, and, moreover, those ends can be accomplished in any number of ways.”). 
31  See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
32  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000). 
33  Hall, supra note 12, at 419. 
34  Id. 
35  Dane, supra note 12, at 36–37. 
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In short, jurisdiction and procedure have both formal and functional 
differences.  With these differences in mind, I now turn to analyzing the ju-
risdictional and procedural character of the removal statues. 
B. Jurisdictional Possibilities in the Removal Statutes 
Analyzing the removal statutes from a jurisdictional vantage point is 
facilitated by classifying the various provisions into three rough categories: 
(1) those that permit removal to the extent of original jurisdiction, (2) those 
that expand jurisdiction, and (3) those that narrow removal authorization 
(and consequently could be seen as narrowing jurisdiction). 
First, there are what I call “derivative jurisdiction” provisions.36  Sec-
tion 1441(a), under the section title of “Actions Removable Generally,” 
states: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have 
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to 
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 
the place where such action is pending.37 
If this is a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts,38 it is derivative of 
original federal jurisdiction already granted elsewhere.  Section 1441(a) 
permits removal only of cases that a federal court could assert jurisdiction 
over ex ante.  Indeed, § 1441(a) incorporates the well-pleaded complaint 
rule,39 the complete diversity rule,40 and rules for calculating the amount in 
controversy,41 all of which have been judicially grafted onto the general 
 
36  I use this term differently from the way it has been used in the removal context in the past.  Prior 
to the 1986 amendments to the general removal statute, courts considered federal removal jurisdiction to 
exist only derivatively to original state court jurisdiction.  Under this doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, 
removal was effective only if the state court had jurisdiction over the case in the first instance.  See 
Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).  The 1986 amendments elimi-
nated that doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, at least in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  See Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, § 3, 100 Stat. 633, 637 (1986) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(f)).  I use the term “derivative jurisdiction” differently here to refer to federal removal authority 
that is coextensive with original federal jurisdiction. 
37  28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
38  But is it?  Is removal at all jurisdictional?  After all, the Constitution speaks only of original and 
appellate (but not removal) jurisdiction.  It strikes me that perhaps removal “jurisdiction” is not an af-
firmative form of “jurisdiction” at all but instead is merely a nonjurisdictional procedure for bringing a 
case already within federal original or appellate jurisdiction before a federal court.  This question is in-
triguing, but it seems to lead to an entirely different kind of argument than the one I make here, for even 
if removal is not a separate grant of jurisdiction, nothing precludes Congress from using its Article III 
powers to enact removal statutes that restrict the original or appellate jurisdiction that is granted else-
where. 
39  See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 n.2 (2002); 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10–11 & n.9 (1983). 
40  See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996). 
41  See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291–92 (1938). 
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original jurisdiction grants in § 1331 and § 1332.42  Other examples of de-
rivative jurisdictional provisions include the removal provision in the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 200543 and the removal provision for bankruptcy ac-
tions.44 
In these cases, if there would be original subject matter jurisdiction, 
there is removal jurisdiction under these provisions; contrapositively, if 
there is no removal jurisdiction, there could never have been original sub-
ject matter jurisdiction either.  Regardless of whether the act of removal is 
procedural or not, the practical effects are the same because any defect ul-
timately is one of jurisdiction.45 
Second, there are undeniable grants of jurisdiction, which are provi-
sions permitting a particular case that could not have been heard in federal 
court originally to be heard there by removal.  For example, § 1441(c) al-
lows for removal of “otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action” 
that are joined with “a separate and independent claim or cause of action 
within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331.”46  There is no compara-
ble statutory authorization of original jurisdiction because supplemental ju-
risdiction applies only to claims that are not separate and independent.47  As 
 
42  28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32.  A case brought originally in federal court is not identical to one removed 
there.  For original diversity cases, the amount in controversy is determined at the time of filing, see St. 
Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289–90, and the plaintiff’s claimed amount is presumed to satisfy the amount 
in controversy, see id. at 288–89.  By contrast, in a case removed on the basis of diversity, the amount in 
controversy is determined at the time the removal notice is filed, see Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 
534, 537 (1939), and the defendant has the burden of proving that the amount in controversy is satisfied, 
see McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (imposing the burden on the 
party invoking federal jurisdiction).  For federal question cases, the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint 
controls for original jurisdiction purposes, but the doctrine contains an “exception” for removal purposes 
if a federal statute wholly displaces the state claim through complete preemption.  See Aetna Health Inc. 
v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207–08 (2004). 
43  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (providing for removal of a CAFA class action and mass actions 
based on diversity jurisdiction even if only minimal diversity is satisfied), with id. § 1332(d) (providing 
for original jurisdiction over a CAFA class action based on diversity jurisdiction even if only minimal 
diversity is satisfied). 
44  Compare id. § 1452 (providing for removal of bankruptcy cases), with id. § 1334 (providing for 
original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases). 
45  Derivative jurisdiction provisions are those that are truly coextensive with original jurisdiction 
requirements.  I do not mean to argue that all of § 1441(a) is derivative.  To the contrary, its requirement 
that the case could have been filed in federal court originally as of the time of removal is, for example, a 
procedural time-of-filing requirement that does not go to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  See Cat-
erpillar, 519 U.S. at 73. 
46  28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 
47  Id. § 1367(a) (requiring claims to be so related that they form one constitutional case).  As Ed-
ward Hartnett has pointed out, § 1441(c) can give rise to at least two unique and constitutional removals 
that otherwise would not have been permitted by statute: (1) a case in which both claims are federal 
question claims but one is otherwise nonremovable, such as a FELA claim; and (2) a case in which the 
nonremovable claim is one that satisfies neither § 1331 nor § 1332 but contains “minimal diversity” 
supporting Article III jurisdiction.  See Edward Hartnett, A New Trick from an Old and Abused Dog: 
Section 1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 
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another example, § 1442(a) provides for removal of a civil or criminal 
prosecution against certain federal entities or officers.48  These kinds of suits 
reflect an independent statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction be-
cause they may be removed even if only the defense depends on federal 
law, notwithstanding the rule of § 1331 that a federal defense cannot alone 
give rise to original jurisdiction.49  As the Supreme Court explained: “Sec-
tion 1442(a), in our view, is a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to do noth-
ing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal 
officer is a defendant.”50  Other removal provisions provide for similar 
grants of statutory jurisdiction.51 
In contrast to the derivative jurisdiction provisions like § 1441(a), these 
kinds of removal provisions provide independent jurisdictional authoriza-
tion; the case can be removed to federal court, but it could not have been 
brought there originally.  They are therefore pure grants of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Third, and most important for my purposes here, there are provisions 
narrowing removal authority such that cases that could have been brought 
in federal court originally may not be removed there.  I focus particularly on 
the forum defendant rule of § 1441(b), which prohibits removal of a diver-
sity case if at least one defendant is a citizen of the state in which the case is 
filed.52  But the general removal statute also expressly excludes certain spe-
cific claims from removal in § 1445.53  Civil actions under the Jones Act54 
and suits under the 1933 Securities Act55 also may not be removed.  And 
other restrictions in the general removal statute create additional barriers to 
                                                                                                                           
1099, 1150–52 (1995).  The second scenario would also appear to extend to a nondiverse claim that con-
tains a federal “ingredient” sufficient to support Article III “arising under” jurisdiction but not § 1331 
“arising under” jurisdiction.  In each case, § 1441(c) acts as a nonderivative grant of statutory subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
48  28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). 
49  Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). 
50  Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989). 
51  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (permitting removal by a foreign state of any civil action brought 
against it without regard to any amount in controversy); id. § 1442a (permitting removal of a civil or 
criminal prosecution for official conduct against a member of the U.S. armed forces); id. § 1444 (provid-
ing for removal of interpleader actions against the United States); 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2000) (providing for 
removal of cases arising out of international or foreign banking); 12 U.S.C. § 1441a (2000) (providing 
for removal of cases involving the Resolution Trust Corporation, even if the RTC is not a formal party); 
id. § 1819(b) (providing for removal of cases involving the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 15 
U.S.C. § 6614(c)(3) (2000) (providing for removal of Y2K actions); 22 U.S.C. § 286g (2000) (providing 
for removal of cases involving the International Monetary Fund). 
52  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
53  Those include damages actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), suits brought 
against a common carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act for damages less than $10,000, civil ac-
tions arising under state workmen’s compensation laws, and actions under the Violence Against Women 
Act.  See id. §§ 1445(a)–(d). 
54  46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000). 
55  15 U.S.C. § 77v (2000). 
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removal that do not exist for original jurisdiction, such as the requirement 
that all defendants join in or consent to the removal56 and the limitation that 
no diversity case may be removed more than one year after filing,57 just to 
name a few.  These narrowing provisions describe situations in which a 
case could be filed in federal court originally but cannot be removed there. 
It is this third category that brings the jurisdictional characterization is-
sues to a head.  It is clear from the statutes that a violation of these provi-
sions means that removal was improper and that the case should be 
remanded to state court.  But is that result because of a jurisdictional defect 
or a procedural defect?  Both require a remand, so we cannot tell which is 
which merely by looking at the effects.  But the distinction is critical be-
cause a remand based on a procedural defect must be made within thirty 
days of removal, whereas a remand based on a jurisdictional defect must be 
made whenever the defect is discovered. 
The difficulty of resolving the distinction is exacerbated by the fact 
that courts,58 commentators,59 and even Congress60 use the phrase “removal 
jurisdiction” casually and often without definition.  The term would cause 
far less confusion if used in conjunction with, say, the derivative jurisdic-
tion provisions of the removal statutes or those provisions that clearly ex-
pand subject matter jurisdiction.  But the casual use of this term implies 
coverage beyond these two clear areas of applicability and has caused great 
confusion about what removal “jurisdiction” means in the context of the ac-
tual language of the statutory provisions governing removal. 
The resulting confusion among the lower courts on jurisdictional char-
acterization issues in this third category is rampant.  Courts disagree about 
whether the forum defendant rule of § 1441(b) is jurisdictional or proce-
dural,61 whether the nonremovable actions bar of § 1445 is jurisdictional or 
 
56  See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900) (“[A]ll defendants 
must join in the application [for removal].”). 
57  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
58  A Westlaw search on April 24, 2007, in the database CTA for the term “removal jurisdiction” 
yielded 971 cases, including 300 since 2000.  Although the Supreme Court has used the term less—
understandably so, given its more limited docket—a Westlaw search on April 24, 2007, in the database 
SCT for the term “removal jurisdiction” still yielded 33 cases, including 8 since 2000, roughly one a 
year. 
59  See, e.g., 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107(B), at 107–30 (3d 
ed. 2006) (titling a section “Basis of Removal Jurisdiction” without defining that jurisdiction); ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.5, at 342 (4th ed. 2003) (titling, within a section on subject 
matter jurisdiction, a section “Removal Jurisdiction”); Brian W. Portugal, Comment, More than a Legal 
Nicety: Why the Forum Defendant Rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) is Jurisdictional, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 
1019, 1037 (2004) (titling a section “Removal Jurisdiction and its Subject Matter Limitations”). 
60  See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 822(e) (1997) (mentioning “original and removal jurisdiction”).  
61  Compare Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding the rule 
to be procedural), Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2000) (same), Korea 
Exch. Bank v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1995) (same), In re Shell Oil Co., 932 
F.2d 1518, 1523 (5th Cir. 1991) (same), Farm Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 
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procedural,62 whether the unanimity requirement is jurisdictional or proce-
dural,63 and whether the one-year limitation for removal of diversity cases in 
§ 1446 is jurisdictional or procedural.64  In short, uncertainty over the juris-
dictional or procedural character of the removal statutes has left lower 
courts confused, split, and calling for guidance.  The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly declined to provide that guidance,65 and it is for that reason a 
                                                                                                                           
1987) (same), Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880, 882–83 (2d Cir. 1970) (same), Am. Oil 
Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1093 (10th Cir. 1970) (same), Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar 
Co., 2 F.2d 435, 437–38 (6th Cir. 1924) (same), Green v. Chetpatananont, No. CIV-05-0317-HE, 2005 
WL 1503438, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 24, 2005) (same), Murphy v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 
2d 1368, 1374–75 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (same), and Ravens Metal Prods., Inc. v. Wilson, 816 F. Supp. 427, 
429 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (same), with Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999) (stat-
ing the rule to be procedural in dictum), Borg-Warner Leasing v. Doyle Elec. Co., 733 F.2d 833, 835 n.2 
(11th Cir. 1984) (same), Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (stat-
ing that the rule is both jurisdictional and waivable), Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1144–45 
(8th Cir. 1992) (holding the rule to be jurisdictional), Dellinger v. Atlas Techs., Inc., 9 F.3d 107, No. 92-
2091, 1993 WL 438648, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 1993) (unpublished table decision) (same), Lindsey v. 
Ky. Med. Investors, Ltd., No. Civ.A.05-116-DLB, 2005 WL 2281607, at *2 & n.3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 
2005) (same), Gilbert v. Choo-Choo Partners II, LLC, No. 1:05-CV-99, 2005 WL 1719907, at *2 (E.D. 
Tenn. July 22, 2005) (same), Elias v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (N.D. Ala. 
2003) (same), and Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eighmy, 849 F. Supp. 40, 42–43 (D. Kan. 1994) 
(same). 
62  Compare Vasquez v. N. County Transit Dist., 292 F.3d 1049, 1060–62 (9th Cir. 2002) (work-
men’s compensation bar is procedural), In re Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 1197, 1201 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(same), Williams v. AC Spark Plugs Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 985 F.2d 783, 786–88 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(same), Feichko v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 213 F.3d 586, 589–90 (10th Cir. 2000) (FELA bar is 
procedural), Albarado v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 199 F.3d 762, 765–66 (5th Cir. 1999) (same), and Carpen-
ter v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 109 F.2d 375, 379–80 (6th Cir. 1940) (same), with New v. Sports & Recrea-
tion, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1096–97, 1095 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding § 1445 jurisdictional), and 
Gamble v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 486 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir. 1973) (same), overruled in part by Lirette 
v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc., 820 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
63  Compare, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding the plaintiff 
waived the right to remand by failing to object to the failure of unanimity within thirty days of removal), 
McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 653–54 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding the procedural defect 
of failing to join all defendants waived absent a failure to object to the defect within thirty days of re-
moval), and Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that a failure to join all 
defendants may render the removal procedurally defective), with Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance 
Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to recognize a fairness exception to the unanimity 
requirement because the requirement is a bright-line limitation on federal jurisdiction). 
64  Compare Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 351 F.3d 611, 614–15 (2d Cir. 2003) (procedural), 
and Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (same), with Rashid v. 
Schenck Constr. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1081, 1086–88 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (jurisdictional), Brock v. Syntex 
Labs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 721, 723 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (same), aff’d, 7 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1993), Perez v. 
Gen. Packer, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1464, 1470–71 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (same), Smith v. MBL Life Assurance 
Corp., 727 F. Supp. 601, 602–04 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (same), Foiles by Foiles v. Merrell Nat’l Labs., 730 
F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (same), and Gray v. Moore Forms, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 543, 544–45 
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (same).  See also 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 59, § 107.41[1][c][iv], at 107–97 (con-
cluding that the better view is that the bar is procedural); cf. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 
n.13 (1996) (referring to the one-year limit in dictum as “a nonjurisdictional argument”). 
65  See, e.g., Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1265, 1266 (2007); Waugh v. Horton, 127 S. 
Ct. 60 (2006). 
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framework for resolving the issue is needed.  The next Part suggests some 
initial proposals for the development of such a framework. 
III. CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING THE JURISDICTIONAL 
CHARACTERIZATION ISSUES IN REMOVAL 
My framework for resolving characterization issues in removal uses 
four factors: (1) whether Congress has specifically designated a provision 
as jurisdictional; (2) whether the function of the particular provision sup-
ports a jurisdictional characterization; (3) whether the effects of a jurisdic-
tional characterization are consistent with the purpose and function of the 
provision; and (4) whether a jurisdictional characterization is doctrinally 
consistent as a matter of historical treatment and cross-doctrinally consis-
tent with the characterization of similar provisions.  I explain each in more 
detail below. 
A. Congressional Designation of Jurisdiction 
1. A Presumption of Jurisdiction.—Congress’s specific designation 
of a provision as jurisdictional should raise a strong presumption of juris-
dictional character for two reasons.  First, Congress—and no one else—has 
the constitutional authority to restrict the jurisdiction of the lower courts66 
and has done so in a multitude of ways.  As a matter of separation of pow-
ers, courts should defer to Congress’s clear statements of jurisdiction unless 
overriding considerations point to a contrary congressional intent, as I ex-
plain more fully below.  Second, a jurisdictional rule often entails heavy 
costs on the litigants and legal system.  Because jurisdiction can be raised at 
any time and even obligates courts to monitor it sua sponte, a jurisdictional 
defect discovered well into trial causes disruption, unfairness, and tremen-
dous waste of time and resources.  A specific designation of jurisdiction by 
Congress ensures that Congress has duly considered these effects and 
deemed them outweighed by the need for or benefits of a jurisdictional bar.  
In short, if Congress has limited removal by demarcating a particular limita-
tion as a jurisdictional bar, and no other circumstances call that demarcation 
into doubt, then the courts need not spend time with the remaining factors 
in my framework.  The bar is jurisdictional.67 
The imposition of a presumption raises two questions.  First, how 
“clear” must Congress be in order to trigger the presumption?  The Court 
has imposed rigorous “clear statement rules” on Congress before, particu-
 
66  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
67  Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006) (“If the Legislature clearly states that a 
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be 
duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.”); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 
127 S. Ct. 1397, 1405 (2007) (reasoning that a “clear and explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction . . . . un-
doubtedly [withdraws jurisdiction]” (emphasis omitted)). 
102:55  (2008) In Search of Removal Jurisdiction 
 67 
larly in the context of congressional attempts to balance state and federal 
power.68  But the federalism cases presume limits on federal power absent a 
clear statement to the contrary, whereas here the presumption of a federal 
jurisdictional limit on removal arises only in the presence of a clear state-
ment.  Thus, a stringent clear statement rule in the removal context broad-
ens federal jurisdiction—the opposite effect of a stringent clear statement 
rule in the federalism context. 
Nevertheless, a similarly stringent clear statement rule in removal is 
justified for several reasons.  The foremost reason is the need for clarity in 
this area, and a clear statement rule whose standard is unclear seems par-
ticularly unhelpful.  In addition, as mentioned above, a clear statement 
would provide assurances that Congress considered the difficulties that 
might arise from a jurisdictional characterization.  Also, the framework for 
resolving the issue is not the presumption alone; if Congress does not make 
a bar unmistakably jurisdictional in the statute, the framework provides ad-
ditional guideposts for finding the bar jurisdictional nonetheless.  Finally, to 
prevent doctrinal confusion, the normal standard for finding a clear state-
ment rule satisfied should apply to all clear statement rules, absent some 
overriding reason to the contrary, as explained below.  For these reasons, 
the presumption should apply only if Congress makes the jurisdictional 
character of a removal bar unmistakably clear. 
The second question that arises is what overrides the presumption of 
jurisdiction?  A statutory expression of jurisdiction could be deemed non-
jurisdictional when it is clear that Congress did not mean to impose such a 
bar.  For example, if Congress attempts to impose a jurisdictional bar where 
the Constitution would not allow it, or if Congress uses the term “jurisdic-
tional” merely to emphasize the mandatory nature of the rule rather than 
impose a jurisdictional bar, then the presumption of jurisdictionality would 
be overridden, and courts need not defer to it.  It should be the very rare 
case indeed when Congress uses such an important word to mean some-
thing other than its traditional meaning,69 and it should be rarer still that a 
court is convinced that Congress’s clear statement does not mean what it so 
clearly states, but I leave it to be applied as an escape hatch in those ex-
tremely rare cases in which the presumption simply is not warranted. 
2. The Converse Presumption.—That a clear statement of jurisdiction 
presumptively controls does not mean, however, that the converse is true, at 
least not in the removal context.  In other words, the absence of a clear 
 
68  See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 274–75 (1985) (imposing a clear 
statement rule for abrogation of state sovereign immunity); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 
(1987) (imposing a clear statement rule for spending clause legislation that purports to regulate the 
states). 
69  The Court has recognized that “the word ‘jurisdiction’ does not in every context connote subject-
matter jurisdiction,” even in congressional statutes.  See Rockwell Int’l, 127 S. Ct. at 1405. 
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statement of jurisdiction does not raise a presumption that the provision is a 
nonjurisdictional bar of procedure. 
Rejecting this converse presumption departs from a number of clear 
statement rules, including one articulated in the recent Supreme Court case 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.70  Arbaugh concerned the distinction between fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction and elements of the federal claim for relief.71  
At issue was the employee-numerosity requirement of Title VII—the re-
striction that the statute cover only employers with fifteen or more employ-
ees.72  The Court unanimously held the employee-numerosity requirement 
to be merely a part of the merits of the plaintiff’s case, not a bar to subject 
matter jurisdiction.73 
In so holding, the Court noted that the requirement appears in a provi-
sion that “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the 
jurisdiction of the district courts.”74  Given the unfairness and waste of judi-
cial resources entailed in tying the employee-numerosity requirement to 
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court followed the “sounder course” of im-
posing a clear statement rule on Congress: “If the Legislature clearly states 
that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, 
then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wres-
tle with the issue.”75  That much adapts well to the removal context.  Ar-
baugh, to this extent, supports the positive presumption in the framework. 
But Arbaugh then adopted the converse presumption, that “when Con-
gress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, 
courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”76  Ap-
plying this converse presumption to removal would ignore the value of the 
other factors that I describe more fully below, factors that could point per-
suasively to a jurisdictional characterization even absent a clear statement 
from Congress.  The Supreme Court recently sanctioned this reasoning in 
Bowles v. Russell,77 finding that statutory time limits for filing a notice of 
appeal are jurisdictional despite the lack of specific jurisdictional words in 
the statute.  The Court reasoned that the long historical treatment of appel-
late time limits as jurisdictional demanded a jurisdictional characterization 
despite the lack of a clear statement of jurisdictionality from Congress.78 
In addition, applying this converse presumption to removal would 
overlook at least five significant differences between a jurisdictional versus 
 
70  546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
71  Id. at 503. 
72  Id. at 503–04 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)). 
73  Id. at 504. 
74  Id. at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)). 
75  Id. at 515–16 (footnote and internal citation omitted). 
76  Id. at 516. 
77  127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
78  Id. at 2363–66. 
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merits characterization in a substantive statute like Title VII and the juris-
dictional versus procedural characterization in removal. 
First, jurisdiction and procedure are, in some respects, more closely 
aligned than jurisdiction and merits.  The Supreme Court itself made this 
point just last term in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International 
Shipping Corp.79  Prior precedent had created a sharp distinction between 
jurisdictional preconditions and merits, and the Court had directed lower 
courts to resolve jurisdictional questions before merits questions, regardless 
of the relative difficulty of the questions.80  That precedent had eliminated 
the practice of lower courts of assuming jurisdiction (a doctrine called “hy-
pothetical jurisdiction”) in the face of difficult jurisdictional questions if the 
case could be resolved easily in favor of the defendant on the merits.81 
In contrast, Sinochem confronted the issue whether a difficult jurisdic-
tional question had to be resolved prior to an easier procedural question, 
namely dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.82  The Court 
unanimously answered no.83  Characterizing forum non conveniens as es-
sentially a supervening venue provision, the Court drew a sharp line be-
tween merits adjudications, for which jurisdiction is essential, and 
procedural dismissals, for which jurisdiction is nonessential.84  The end re-
sult is that a district court can dismiss a case on grounds of forum non con-
veniens without reaching jurisdictional questions “when considerations of 
convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.”85 
Although these cases deal with decisional sequencing, they suggest 
that the Court considers jurisdictional issues to logically (even definition-
ally) precede merits questions as a jurisprudential matter, while jurisdic-
tional issues do not have the same rigid priority over procedural issues.  
Arbaugh, which dealt with the separation of jurisdictional preconditions 
from merits elements, then, may not speak to the more difficult separation 
of jurisdiction and procedure. 
Second, as Howard Wasserman has argued, because normal trial struc-
ture tends to cause jurisdictional issues to arise in separate contexts from 
and prior to merits questions, the two types of issues are more appropriately 
resolved at different times in the formal litigation.86  By contrast, jurisdic-
tional and procedural defects in the removal process come up simultane-
ously.  Indeed, the general removal statute places a priority on resolving 
 
79  127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007). 
80  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998). 
81  Id. at 93–94. 
82  Sinochem, 127 S. Ct. at 1188. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. at 1191–92 (“Jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the mer-
its.”). 
85  Id. at 1192. 
86  See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 649–55. 
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procedural defects within thirty days of removal to solidify the forum.  
Thus, the disparity in formal placement within the dispute resolution proc-
ess that exists in the jurisdictional versus merits characterization does not 
similarly animate the jurisdictional versus procedural characterization of the 
general removal statute. 
Third, as Wasserman also points out, the jurisdictional versus merits 
characterization problem implicates the identity of the proper decision-
maker.87  Arbaugh recognized this as well.88  Jurisdictional questions are de-
cided by judges, whereas merits questions, at least in jury trials, are decided 
by jurors.  By contrast, all issues in the removal statutes—procedural or ju-
risdictional—are decided by judges.  Therefore, the removal context lacks 
the concern for identifying the proper decisionmaker that exists with sub-
stantive statutes. 
Fourth, also drawing upon Wasserman’s arguments, the confusion be-
tween merits and jurisdiction is often grounded in a misconception of 
whose jurisdiction is at issue.89  Congress must be wary of its own authority 
to legislate.  In Arbaugh, for example, the employee-numerosity require-
ment of Title VII could be interpreted as a proxy for activity that affects in-
terstate commerce, thereby allowing Congress to regulate it.90  Congress is 
bound by that requirement when legislating under its Commerce Clause 
powers.  It is not so bound when legislating under its Article III powers to 
control the lower courts.  Congress has no need to designate proxies sup-
porting its own jurisdiction to provide for and regulate removal. 
Fifth, substantive statutes like Title VII implicate federalism values to 
a lesser degree than does removal.  Removal plucks a case from a state 
court of competent jurisdiction, without the state court’s consent, and de-
posits the case in the federal system, all at the whim of one of the parties.  
Removal can occur years into the case, after the state court has become in-
vested in it and expended judicial resources overseeing it.  Once removal 
has been effectuated, the general removal statute then directs the state court 
to “proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.”91  Thus, 
unlike merits-stripping requirements such as Title VII’s employee-
numerosity requirement, in which no court would be able to provide relief, 
removal usually addresses a conflict between two courts that are both com-
petent to provide relief, and it creates this conflict in the middle of the case, 
to the great disruption of both state authority over the case and the plain-
 
87  See id. at 662–65 (arguing that “the identity of the decision-maker on an issue remains signifi-
cant”). 
88  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006).   
89  See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 680–83 (arguing that a statutory jurisdictional element may 
point to the constitutional authorization of Congress to legislate in the subject matter rather than that of 
the courts to hear the case). 
90  See id. at 680–81. 
91  28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2000). 
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tiff’s choice of forum.  It is for these reasons that removal historically has 
been viewed narrowly.92  Applying the Arbaugh converse presumption in 
the removal context would create tension with this view.  A presumption of 
nonjurisdictionality would transform virtually every removal provision into 
a rule of procedure whose noncompliance is waived if not asserted within 
thirty days of removal.  That would eliminate, in most cases, any chance for 
remand thirty days after removal, even if the defendant should not have 
been allowed to take the case from state court.  Such a presumption slights 
the delicate role that removal plays in the federal-state balance.93 
For these reasons, Arbaugh’s converse presumption—that the absence 
of a clear statement of jurisdiction gives rise to a presumption of nonjuris-
dictionality—while perhaps appropriate in jurisdiction versus merits charac-
terization issues in substantive statutes because of the broader distinctions 
between jurisdiction and merits, is unwarranted in the jurisdiction versus 
procedural characterization issues of removal, in which the concepts are 
closer and have significant federalism implications. 
Nevertheless, Arbaugh’s positive presumption—that a clear statement 
of jurisdiction raises a presumption of jurisdiction—remains an important 
part of the framework by deferring to separation of powers and by simplify-
ing the complicated inquiry where Congress has clearly demarcated a provi-
sion as jurisdictional.  Absent such a clear statement, a court should not end 
the inquiry in favor of a procedural characterization but instead should con-
sider the other factors in the framework discussed below. 
B. The Functions of the Provision 
1. Parsing the Functions.—Absent a presumption of jurisdiction, a 
court should turn to the other factors in the framework, the first of which is 
an evaluation of the functions of the rule at issue.  The functions should be 
analyzed with two features in mind.  First, does the rule separate classes of 
cases, or does it merely process claims and relate to modes of proceedings?  
Second, is the rule directed primarily at the power of the court and underly-
ing societal values such as federalism, or is it directed at the rights, obliga-
tions, or conveniences of the parties?  Based on the natures of jurisdiction 
and procedure discussed above in the primer, a rule separating classes of 
 
92  See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941) (“Not only does the lan-
guage of the [removal statute] evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts on removal, but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of 
federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation.”). 
93  The Court has imposed clear statement rules to protect federalism in the past, see, e.g., Atasca-
dero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (imposing a clear statement rule for abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (imposing a clear state-
ment rule for spending clause legislation that purports to regulate the states), though some have doubted 
their utility in providing reliable safeguards for federalism values, see Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for 
Federalism: Clear Statement Rules after Gonzalez v. Raich, 45 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113 (2007). 
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cases or directed at the power of the court or underlying societal values 
serves jurisdictional purposes, whereas a rule regulating the process or 
mode of the case and directed to the rights and obligations of the parties 
serves procedural purposes. 
This functional factor draws heavily on recent Supreme Court jurisdic-
tional clarifications in non-removal areas.  In Kontrick v. Ryan,94 for exam-
ple, the Court held that Bankruptcy Rule 4004, which gives a Chapter 7 
creditor sixty days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors to file 
a complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge,95 is not jurisdictional.96  The 
Court reasoned that the courts already have general subject matter jurisdic-
tion over bankruptcy cases falling under the bankruptcy statute.97  The 
Bankruptcy Rules, meanwhile, “shall not be construed to extend or limit the 
jurisdiction of the courts.”98  Instead, such rules “merely prescribe the 
method by which the jurisdiction granted the courts by Congress is to be 
exercised.”99  Such “claim-processing rules” are not, therefore, limits on 
federal jurisdiction; rather, such jurisdictional limits are reserved for “pre-
scriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and 
the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory au-
thority.”100  A year later, in Eberhart v. United States,101 the Court applied 
Kontrick to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(2), which sets a time 
deadline to file a motion for a new trial,102 and concluded that Kontrick set-
tled the issue that such a claim-processing rule is not jurisdictional.103  Thus, 
after Kontrick and Eberhart, it seems settled that the claim-processing rules 
of the federal rules are nonjurisdictional.104 
There are good reasons to resist the temptation to read Kontrick and 
Eberhart as mandating a procedural characterization of removal limitations.  
The federal rules at issue in those cases were adopted under the auspices of 
 
94  540 U.S. 443 (2004). 
95  FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). 
96  Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 447 (“[A] debtor forfeits the right to rely on Rule 4004 if the debtor does 
not raise the Rule’s time limitation before the bankruptcy court reaches the merits of the creditor’s ob-
jection to discharge.”). 
97  Id. at 452–53.  
98  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9030. 
99  12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3141, at 485 (2d ed. 1998).  
100  Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455. 
101  546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam). 
102  Id. at 13.  
103  Id. at 15–17.  
104  But see Philip A. Pucillo, Jurisdictional Prescriptions, Nonjurisdictional Processing Rules, and 
Federal Appellate Practice: The Implications of Kontrick and Eberhart, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=970050 (arguing that the tim-
ing prescriptions of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are jurisdictional because 
they reflect the jurisdictional prescriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2107). 
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the Rules Enabling Act,105 under which the rules are drafted by an advisory 
committee in consultation with the bar and other groups, are transmitted to 
the Supreme Court, which adopts, rejects, or modifies them, and then be-
come law unless specifically rejected by Congress.  Such rules do not, 
therefore, have the kind of congressional imprimatur that a statute such as 
the removal statute, enacted under the constitutional requirements of bicam-
eral passage and presidential presentment, has.106  This difference is particu-
larly acute in the jurisdictional context because only Congress—not the 
Court—has the constitutional authority to limit the jurisdiction of the lower 
courts.107  The Rules Enabling Act itself recognizes and reserves this power, 
characterizing the delegated power as one to adopt “general rules of prac-
tice and procedure”108 and limiting the adopted rules to those that do not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”109  The federal rules of 
bankruptcy and civil procedure confirm this limitation by affirming that 
they “shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction” of the 
courts.110  It would raise constitutional concerns for a federal rule adopted 
under the Rules Enabling Act to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of a 
federal court without some express authorization by Congress. 
By contrast, the removal statutes are acts of Congress specifically au-
thorized under Congress’s Article III power to control the jurisdiction of the 
lower courts.  They do not fall under the procedures of the Rules Enabling 
 
105  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
106  The Supreme Court has hinted as much in other contexts.  See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 
2360, 2364 & n.2 (2007) (recognizing a “jurisdictional significance of the fact that a time limitation is 
set forth in a statute”); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63–64 (1970) (“We cannot accept the view 
that . . . [Supreme Court Rule 20.1’s] time requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the 
Court.  [The rule] contains no language that calls for so harsh an interpretation, and it must be remem-
bered that this rule was not enacted by Congress but was promulgated by this Court under authority of 
Congress to prescribe rules concerning the time limitations for taking appeals and applying for certiorari 
in criminal cases.  The procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business 
are not jurisdictional and can be relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion when the ends of 
justice so require.” (internal citation omitted)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) 
(observing that court rules cannot extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by statute). 
107  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in . . . such in-
ferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
108  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). 
109  Id. § 2072(b).  The two exceptions—delegations to set rules regarding finality and interlocutory 
appeals, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c), § 1292(e)—are statutorily based and therefore prove the rule. 
110  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9030; FED. R. CIV. P. 82.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do 
not contain such expressive language, but Rule 1 appears to restrict them to “procedure” and not to “ju-
risdiction.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(a)(1) (“These rules govern the procedure in all criminal proceedings in 
the [federal courts] . . . .”); cf. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15–17 (2005) (per curiam) (con-
cluding, on the basis of Kontrick, which relied in part on the language of Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Rule 9030 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, that Rule 33 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure is not jurisdictional).  The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure previ-
ously contained a jurisdiction-disavowing rule, see FED. R. APP. P. 1(b), but that Rule has been 
abrogated in light of the 1990 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act authorizing the Court to set rules 
regarding finality and interlocutory appeals.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c), § 1292(e). 
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Act, but rather became law through bicameral passage and presentment.  
Thus, the constitutional concerns of a jurisdictional federal rule do not ap-
ply to the removal statutes.  The removal statutes have no internal limitation 
to matters of procedure and do not disavow jurisdictional tinkering—
indeed, it would be difficult for the removal statutes to be construed that 
way in light of their jurisdiction-expanding provisions, identified above in 
Part II.  As the Court has acknowledged, a congressional statute that regu-
lates the jurisdiction of the lower courts stands on different footing than a 
rule of procedure adopted under the Rules Enabling Act.111  Thus, it would 
be a mistake to apply Kontrick and Eberhart to removal without further 
thought. 
But, after further thought, I see no reason why the analysis in Kontrick 
and Eberhart should not at least play a role in the removal characterization 
context.  The reasoning of those decisions has its foundation in the differing 
natures of jurisdiction and procedure and their roles in litigation.  Those 
considerations apply broadly and equally to removal.  Indeed, the Court it-
self has used similar reasoning beyond the federal rules.112  Accordingly, 
analyzing the function of a particular removal provision in light of the na-
tures of and differences between jurisdiction and procedure, as did Kontrick 
and Eberhart, is appropriate, and this analysis is an important tool in resolv-
ing jurisdictional characterization issues. 
2. Potential Difficulties.—There are, however, three potential and re-
lated difficulties that the Court failed to resolve in Kontrick and Eberhart 
but that may have to be addressed when using this framework.  The first is 
what in the world “claim-processing,” “modes of proceeding,” and “sepa-
rating classes of cases” really mean.  Neither Kontrick nor Eberhart pro-
vides much insight into the meanings of those phrases beyond categorizing 
the particular provisions at issue in those cases. 
A little uncertainty here is not fatal.  Commonsense application of even 
these admittedly unclear terms should be relatively easy in most cases.  For 
 
111  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2364–65; Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 453 (2004). 
112  See, e.g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413–14 (2004) (holding a time limitation on an 
Equal Access to Justice Act fee claim was procedural rather than jurisdictional because it concerned a 
“mode of relief” rather than a separation of classes of claim); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 393–94 (1982) (holding a time prescription of Title VII to be procedural rather than jurisdic-
tional because it did not speak in jurisdictional terms and because it was akin to a statute of limitations 
rather than a jurisdictional bar).  Bowles is not to the contrary.  Although the result in Bowles is arguably 
in tension with that of cases like Arbaugh, Kontrick, Eberhart, Scarborough, and Zipes, Bowles relied 
heavily on another factor in the framework, a long historical tradition of treating the provision at issue as 
jurisdictional.  Thus, Bowles can be read as leaving intact the analysis of those prior cases.  Bowles, 127 
S. Ct. at 2364 (“Although several of our recent decisions have undertaken to clarify the distinction be-
tween claims-processing rules and jurisdictional rules, none of them calls into question our longstanding 
treatment of statutory time limits for taking an appeal as jurisdictional.”).  To the extent that it does not, 
as I explain below, Bowles should be modified to account for the other important factors of the frame-
work.  See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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example, the § 1446(a) requirement that the notice of removal be signed 
pursuant to Rule 11 is easily characterized as a rule of process under any 
commonsense application of the term.  By comparison, the prohibition of 
removal of workman’s compensation cases under § 1445(c) does separate 
out a kind of case for exclusion from removal.  Section 1445(c) separates 
out a “class” of cases that is meaningfully different from a “class” of cases 
defined by notices of removal that are defective under § 1446(a). 
For issues that are closer to the line between jurisdictional and proce-
dural, applying this factor may be more difficult, but that does not mean 
that convincing arguments do not exist.  In addition, as different courts ap-
ply the framework to specific instances, the guideposts in this factor should 
become clearer and easier to apply.  To the extent that a particular issue that 
arises is just too difficult to characterize as a claim-processing rule or one 
that separates classes of cases, then this factor in the framework may be less 
helpful than the other factors, but that does not mean that the framework as 
a whole cannot be effective. 
The second potential difficulty is separating out primary functions 
from secondary functions and effects.  A particular provision’s primary 
function of limiting the power of the court by excluding certain classes of 
cases may have collateral effects on the parties by, for example, providing 
one party with a more favorable forum.  On the flipside, a different provi-
sion’s primary function of defining the rights or obligations of a party may 
have ancillary effects on broader societal values.113  The challenge will be in 
determining which purposes are primary and which are ancillary. 
Section 1445’s prohibition on removal of worker’s compensation cases 
provides just one example of this difficulty.  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that Congress made these cases nonremovable to lessen the “trial bur-
dens that claimants might suffer by having to go to trial in federal rather 
than state courts due to the fact that the state courts are likely to be closer to 
an injured worker’s home and may also provide him with special procedural 
advantages in workmen’s compensation cases.”114  On the other hand, the 
nonremovability provision also achieved the intended effect of reducing the 
number of workmen’s compensation cases that were clogging the federal 
courts, when state courts were just as—if not more—competent to resolve 
them.115  Parsing out which of these functions is primary and which is sec-
ondary may be very difficult indeed. 
 
113  See generally Lees, supra note 12, at 1488 (making this point). 
114  Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351–52 (1961); see also S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 
9 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3106 (“Very often cases removed to the Federal courts 
require the workman to travel long distances and to bring his witnesses at great expense.  This places an 
undue burden upon the workman and very often the workman settles his claim because he cannot afford 
the luxury of a trial in Federal court.”). 
115  S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 9, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3105 (“[T]he workload of the Fed-
eral courts has greatly increased because of the removal of workmen’s compensation cases from the 
State courts . . . .”); Horton, 367 U.S. at 350–51 (“[T]he purpose and effect of the 1958 amendment were 
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The third potential difficulty is separating out jurisdictional rules from 
merely mandatory rules, a difficulty that has plagued even the Supreme 
Court.116  A mandatory rule restricts the discretion of the court to deviate 
from the rule when one party timely objects, but that does not mean that it 
is jurisdictional.117  As the Court has recognized, nonjurisdictional but man-
datory legal rules have a functional role to play: 
The provision is not discretionary only, but mandatory to the government; and 
its purpose is to inform the defendant of the testimony which he will have to 
meet, and to enable him to prepare his defence.  Being enacted for his benefit, 
he may doubtless waive it, if he pleases; but he has a right to insist upon it, and 
if he seasonably does so, the trial cannot lawfully proceed until the require-
ment has been complied with.118 
The difficulty arises when the statute provides no clear guidance for deter-
mining whether a provision is jurisdictional or merely mandatory. 
Thus, analyzing the function of the removal provision in question both 
is appropriate and may be critical for resolving its character as jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                           
to reduce congestion in the Federal District Courts partially caused by the large number of civil cases 
that were being brought under the long-standing $3,000 jurisdictional rule.”). 
116  Compare Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362 (holding the time limit for filing a notice of appeal to be ju-
risdictional based on prior cases calling the limit “mandatory and jurisdictional”), with Eberhart v. 
United States, 546 U.S. 12, 17–20 (2005) (per curiam) (discouraging the mantra “mandatory and juris-
dictional” as an imprecise phrase that obscures the mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterization of 
the rules), Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 (2001) (noting that “imperfections in noticing an 
appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, 
to which appellate court,” in holding an omitted signature on a notice of appeal was not fatal because the 
notice did not fail to identify the parties taking the appeal), and Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 180–81 
(1962) (holding that a court of appeals could not dismiss an appeal sua sponte for a violation of the re-
quirement in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that the notice specify which judgment was the 
subject of the appeal when the parties fully briefed the appeal and neither party was prejudiced by the 
violation), and with United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960) (characterizing a time limit in 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for filing a notice of appeal as “mandatory and jurisdictional,” 
and holding the limit not subject to extension for reasons of excusable neglect).  Commentators are well 
aware of the Court’s imprecision.  See, e.g., Dane, supra note 12, at 39 (“[T]he phrase ‘mandatory and 
jurisdictional’ is one of those standard doubles (‘null and void,’ ‘cease and desist’) that so fill legal poet-
ics.  But there is less to this than one might think.  First, legal rules can be mandatory without being ju-
risdictional.” (footnotes omitted)); Hall, supra note 12, at 410 (“In each instance where the Supreme 
Court has referred to the thirty-day appeal period as ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’ it might have simply 
said ‘mandatory,’ for the only issue was whether the court of appeals had authority to relax the exact 
requirements of Rule 4(a).”); Pucillo, supra note 12, at 316 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s own 
confusing language has caused the enforcement of Rule 3(c)’s requirements by the courts of appeals to 
become “mired in confusion and unpredictability”). 
117  See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
42 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/ (acknowledging the distinc-
tion and arguing that it could improve doctrinal consistency); Hall, supra note 12, at 410 (analyzing the 
Supreme Court cases reciting the mantra “mandatory and jurisdictional” and concluding that, in each, 
the word “jurisdictional” was superfluous and that the Court could have reached the same result simply 
by construing the statute as “mandatory”).  
118  Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 304 (1892). 
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or procedural.  Though the analysis may not be easy, it can be facilitated by 
the next factor in the framework. 
C. The Effects of the Characterization 
In addition to considering the functions of the removal provision at is-
sue, a court should consider the effects of characterizing the provision as ju-
risdictional or procedural.  Those effects should give clues as to whether a 
jurisdictional or procedural characterization makes sense in the statutory 
scheme. 
In Arbaugh, the Court undertook just such an inquiry, albeit in the con-
text of a jurisdictional versus merits characterization and on a relatively nar-
row scale.  There, the Court asked whether Congress intended the rule to 
have the effects that a jurisdictional characterization would give it.119  Not-
ing that a jurisdictional characterization of the employee-numerosity re-
quirement would require courts to raise and address the issue sua sponte,120 
the Court reasoned that nothing in Title VII suggested that Congress in-
tended courts to have such a responsibility.121 
The same reasons discussed above that caution against applying Ar-
baugh to the removal context apply here.122  After all, Arbaugh also consid-
ered the effect of classifying the employee-numerosity requirement as 
jurisdictional on the traditional understanding that merits questions are de-
cided by juries rather than judges,123 a concern that is inapplicable to re-
moval, which is overseen only by judges.  Nevertheless, the methodology 
seems to be entirely appropriate in the removal context: look to the effects 
of characterizing a provision as jurisdictional or procedural to determine 
whether that characterization makes sense in light of the general removal 
statute as a whole. 
Thus, in applying this factor of the framework, courts may consider a 
wide range of implications, some of which might be the following: (1) the 
burdens on courts to monitor compliance sua sponte, (2) the benefits of al-
lowing parties to consent to noncompliance, (3) the burden on the party op-
posing removal to discover and prove a violation within the thirty days 
required for procedural defects, (4) the effects on federalism values, (5) the 
resulting inefficiencies and equities of a particular characterization, and 
(6) the underlying purposes of removal.  I do not mean this to be an exhaus-
tive list but rather merely illustrative of the kinds of features of the charac-
terization inquiry that may be relevant under this factor. 
 
119  Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513–16 (2006). 
120  Id. at 513–14 (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); Ruhrgas AG v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)).  
121  Id.  
122  See supra text accompanying notes 76–93. 
123  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. 
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D. Doctrinal and Cross-Doctrinal Consistency 
Finally, a court should consider the effects of a particular characteriza-
tion on doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency. 
1. Doctrinal Consistency.—Doctrinal consistency asks how the par-
ticular provision and its doctrinal equivalents have been characterized his-
torically.  Akin to stare decisis, this factor takes historical treatment and 
settled expectations into account.  If a particular type of provision has been 
characterized as jurisdictional uniformly over a long period of time, doc-
trinal consistency would suggest that it should continue to be held jurisdic-
tional.  The same inertial force applies to provisions long and uniformly 
held to be nonjurisdictional. 
Bowles v. Russell124 illustrates this factor.  There the Court, in charac-
terizing the time limit for filing a notice of appeal codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2107 as jurisdictional, relied on the fact that the Court had “long and re-
peatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdic-
tional in nature.”125 
The existence of a uniform historical treatment is a relevant factor in 
the jurisdictional characterization analysis.  Such doctrinal consistency 
helps streamline litigation, reduce uncertainty, and control costs.  And, as 
for ease of application, this factor usually should be fairly straightforward: 
either there is a long, consistent historical pedigree or there is not. 
Doctrinal consistency, however, is just one factor in the framework.  If 
the other factors discussed above strongly point to a characterization un-
supported by an historical pedigree, then the historical pedigree should give 
way.  I therefore disagree with Bowles to the extent that it considers the ex-
istence of an historical pedigree to exclude other considerations.126  Simi-
larly, if the presumption discussed above applies, then the historical 
pedigree should not control. 
Bowles, however, is an example of an extreme case.  The historical 
pedigree of the time limit for filing a notice of appeal, according to Bowles, 
was a single, unbroken jurisdictional characterization spanning over 150 
years.  Not all provisions have such an historical pedigree of jurisdictional 
or procedural characterization.  If a statute is new or has recently been 
amended, a characterization pedigree may not exist.  Even longstanding 
statutes may have scant historical pedigree simply because opportunities to 
determine their characterizations are limited.  Still other provisions may 
 
124  126 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
125  Id. at 2362; see also id. at 2364 n.2 (“[I]t is indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of ap-
peal have been treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century.”). 
126  For more on why I believe Bowles is poorly reasoned and doctrinally flawed, see Dodson, supra 
note 117.  That I disagree with its characterization of § 2107 and much of its reasoning, however, does 
not mean that the historical treatment of a statute, as noted by Bowles, has no place in a framework for 
resolving jurisdictional characterization issues in removal. 
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have received extensive—but inconsistent—treatment.127  In short, unless 
the provision at issue and its doctrinal equivalents have a clear, consistent, 
and long historical pedigree of being characterized as jurisdictional or pro-
cedural, this factor should be given less weight than the others.  Even if 
such a pedigree does exist, doctrinal consistency is just one factor, which 
may be overridden by the other factors in the framework. 
2. Cross-Doctrinal Consistency.—Akin to but slightly different from 
doctrinal consistency is cross-doctrinal consistency.  Doctrinal consistency 
looks at the particular provision and its doctrinal equivalents, such as the 
statutes of limitations.  Cross-doctrinal consistency, on the other hand, 
looks at how doctrinally analogous provisions have been treated. 
The Court used a cross-doctrinal approach in Zipes v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. by comparing the Title VII time bar at issue to statutes of limita-
tions, which have long been held to be nonjurisdictional.128  Kontrick did the 
same, reasoning that the bankruptcy rule in question was similar to other 
time bars that must be raised in an affirmative defense or be forfeited.129  
These might suggest, for example, that the thirty-day time bar for removal130 
is likewise a nonjurisdictional procedural rule. 
As another example, take the old 1875 version of removal, which al-
lowed any civil case removable under Article III to be removed by either 
party, subject to a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement.131  Characteriz-
ing the amount-in-controversy requirement as jurisdictional would follow 
the well-tread footsteps of the diversity statute’s analogous amount-in-
controversy requirement,132 long held to be jurisdictional.  Characterizing 
two similar requirements similarly both makes good commonsense and fos-
ters cross-doctrinal consistency in jurisdictional determinations. 
IV. A CASE STUDY IN JURISDICTIONAL CHARACTERIZATION: 
THE FORUM DEFENDANT RULE 
To provide an example of why the characterization of removal provi-
sions as jurisdictional or procedural matters, the disarray that the issue has 
engendered among the lower courts, and how this framework could be used 
to resolve the issues in a more reasoned way, I present a case study of the 
 
127  For example, the characterization of the forum defendant rule of the removal statute, which I 
discuss in Part IV, has a relatively short pedigree, and its historical meaning is complicated by recent 
amendments to the removal statute.  No Supreme Court case has decided the issue, but the circuits have 
given it extensive and conflicting treatment.  As I conclude below, these features suggest that doctrinal 
consistency may not be a strong factor in determining the characterization of the forum defendant rule.  
See infra text accompanying notes 183–84. 
128  455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982). 
129  Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458–59 (2004). 
130  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). 
131  18 Stat. 470, Ch. 137, § 2 (1875). 
132  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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forum defendant rule, comparing two litigations that dealt with its charac-
terization.  The forum defendant rule falls in the third category of authoriza-
tion-narrowing provisions, those that border the line between jurisdictional 
and procedural in the general removal statute.  These two cases illustrate the 
split between the Ninth and Eighth Circuits regarding the characterization 
of the forum defendant rule.   
A. The Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc. Litigation 
1. The Facts.—Emma Lively sued Wild Oats Markets, Inc. in Cali-
fornia state court for negligence and premises liability under state law after 
slipping in one of their California food stores.133  Because Lively was a citi-
zen of New York and Wild Oats was not, in January 2004 Wild Oats timely 
filed a notice of removal to the Central District of California on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship.134  In its removal papers, Wild Oats claimed that it 
was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Colo-
rado.135 
State court ostensibly was preferable to Lively and detrimental to Wild 
Oats for a number of reasons.  First, California requires only a three-fourths 
jury majority for a verdict, whereas the federal rules require unanimity.136  
Second, the county jury pool was likely to be more favorable to individual 
plaintiffs and hostile to business defendants than the district pool.137  A host 
of other strategic reasons may have animated Lively’s decision to file in 
state rather than federal court.138  Lively, however, having no reason to 
doubt the veracity of Wild Oats’ claims of its own citizenship (and, in any 
 
133  Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2006). 
134  Id.  
135  Id. 
136  Appellee’s Answering Brief at 5–6, Lively, 456 F.3d 933 (No. 04-56682), 2005 WL 4121126; cf. 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900) (“[A]ll the defendants must join in 
the application [for removal] . . . .”). 
137  Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 136, at 5–6 (stating that Wild Oats filed for removal to 
“avoid . . . potentially liberal state court juries”).  
138  For example, her attorney may have been more knowledgeable of local courts and more inte-
grated into the local bar, whereas Wild Oats’ attorneys may have felt more comfortable in federal court 
with nationally followed federal procedures, see 16 MOORE ET AL., supra note 59, § 107.03, at 107–25; 
Lively may have seen state court as less receptive than federal courts to summary judgments or dismiss-
als in favor of defendants, see Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 
YALE L.J. 27, 39–41 (2003); Lively may have viewed state-court litigation as less expensive, see Greg-
ory M. Cesarano & Daniel R. Vega, So You Thought a Remand was Imminent? Post-Removal Litigation 
and The Waiver of the Right to Seek a Remand Grounded on Removal Defects, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2000, at 
22–24; or both Lively and Wild Oats simply may have believed that defendants generally have a higher 
win rate in removed cases, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything about the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 
(1998). 
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case, no evidence on which to base any doubt),139 did not object to the re-
moval,140 and the case proceeded to discovery. 
In August 2004, during oral argument on Wild Oats’ motion for sum-
mary judgment, the district court sua sponte questioned whether Wild Oats’ 
principal place of business was truly Colorado.  After requesting and ob-
taining additional evidence on the question, the district court found that 
Wild Oats’ principal place of business was in fact California, making it a 
citizen of that state for diversity and removal purposes.141 
Because Wild Oats was a citizen of the state in which the case was 
originally filed, the district court held a show cause hearing to determine 
whether the case should be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under the forum defendant rule of § 1441(b),142 which states that any action 
that could be filed in federal court originally based on diversity of citizen-
ship “shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly 
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such ac-
tion is brought.”143  Despite the passage of time in federal court, if the forum 
defendant rule was deemed to be jurisdictional, then the case had to be re-
manded.144 
At the hearing, Wild Oats argued that the forum defendant rule is pro-
cedural, not jurisdictional.  Because it was procedural, Wild Oats argued, 
Lively had forfeited her right to object to the violation by failing to raise it 
within thirty days of removal as required by § 1447(c).145  The district court 
disagreed and remanded the case, holding the defect to be jurisdictional and 
thus not forfeitable.  Wild Oats appealed.146  
 
139  Corporate citizenship is founded both on the state of incorporation and the corporation’s princi-
pal place of business.  Unlike the state of incorporation, which generally is readily discernable from, 
among other sources, the Internet, see, e.g., Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt. Place, L.L.C., 
350 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2003), a corporation’s principal place of business often is very difficult to 
discern; indeed, courts are not even in consensus on the applicable legal test.  Compare, e.g., Scot 
Typewriter Co., Inc. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (using the “nerve center 
test”), with Kelly v. U.S. Steel Co., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960) (rejecting the “nerve center test” in fa-
vor of what some have called the “muscle test”), and Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (using a “total activity test”). 
140  Lively, 456 F.3d at 936. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. at 936–37. 
143  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). 
144  Id. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 
145  Lively, 456 F.3d at 936.  Section 1447(c) states: “A motion to remand the case on the basis of 
any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within [thirty] days after the filing 
of the notice of removal . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
146  Lively, 456 F.3d at 937. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 82 
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision.—The Ninth Circuit reversed, con-
cluding that the forum defendant rule is procedural on three grounds.147  
First, the court determined that the legislative history of § 1447(c) sup-
ported its procedural character.148  As originally written, that section pro-
vided that remand must be made at any time if the case was “removed 
improvidently and without jurisdiction.”149  In 1988, Congress changed that 
language to provide that “any defect in removal procedure” must be made 
within thirty days of removal, but that remand must be made at any time if 
the court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”150  Finally, in 1996, Congress 
adopted the current language, which provides for remand only within thirty 
days of removal for “any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.”151  The Ninth Circuit, surveying these transformations, concluded that 
Congress’s substitution of “defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion” for “defect in removal procedure” represented a narrowing of defects 
that should be considered “jurisdictional.”152  The court concluded that that 
narrowing excluded the forum defendant rule from the jurisdictional 
realm.153 
Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a procedural characterization 
of the forum defendant rule comported with the rule’s purpose.154  The court 
noted that removal based on diversity jurisdiction is intended to protect out-
of-state defendants from possible prejudices in state court, and that the need 
for this protection is absent when the removing defendant is in-state.155  The 
court reasoned that a procedural characterization of the forum defendant 
rule would return to the plaintiff the ultimate choice of forum because the 
plaintiff could either move to remand to state court (within the thirty-day 
window) or choose to stay in federal court by not moving to remand within 
the thirty days.156  By contrast, reasoned the Ninth Circuit, a jurisdictional 
characterization of the forum defendant rule would allow the court to re-
mand the case to state court even if the plaintiff preferred to remain in fed-
eral court.157 
 
147  The Ninth Circuit also concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand or-
der under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  Lively, 456 F.3d at 937–39.  
148  Id. at 939. 
149  28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1948), amended by Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139 § 84(a) (redesignating 
subsection (e) as subsection (c)).  
150  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988). 
151  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. II 1996). 
152  Lively, 456 F.3d at 939. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. at 940. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
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Third, the Ninth Circuit relied upon a Supreme Court case, Grubbs v. 
General Electric Credit Corp.,158 which held that where a removed case is 
tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters judgment, 
the jurisdictional issue on appeal is not whether removal was proper, but 
whether the district court would have had original jurisdiction over the 
case.159  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court’s comment that 
the defect could not be raised after judgment, contrary to most defects of 
subject matter jurisdiction, suggested that the Supreme Court considered 
removal defects to be procedural, not jurisdictional.160 
3. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion.—The Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion is flawed on its own terms for several reasons.  First, the court’s 
legislative history argument merely begs the question.  It is true that 
§ 1447(c)’s iterations demonstrate an attempt to broaden the category of 
nonjurisdictional defects subject to its thirty-day remand window, but it 
does not and has never attempted to define which defects are jurisdictional 
and which are not.  The conclusion of the Ninth Circuit—that the broaden-
ing of the nonjurisdictional category encompassed the forum defendant 
rule—does not logically follow from the changes to § 1447(c) unless the fo-
rum defendant rule was seen as nonjurisdictional in the first place, the very 
question presented. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s “purpose” argument seems backwards.  
Even assuming that the purpose of the forum defendant rule is to protect the 
plaintiff’s preferred choice of forum, a jurisdictional characterization pro-
motes this purpose far more than a procedural characterization.  A jurisdic-
tional rule would require remand back to the plaintiff’s preferred forum in 
all cases, whereas a procedural rule would require remand only if the plain-
tiff timely moved for remand within thirty days of removal.  True, as the 
Ninth Circuit pointed out, a jurisdictional characterization will require re-
mand even if the plaintiff prefers federal court, but it seems extremely 
unlikely that a plaintiff, having initially chosen state court over federal 
court, would later prefer to litigate in the defendant’s choice of forum. 
Third, Grubbs is irrelevant, though the Ninth Circuit’s confusion is un-
derstandable.  Grubbs dealt with two separate defects and stands for two 
separate propositions regarding them, neither of which have to do with the 
process of characterizing rules as jurisdictional or procedural: (1) a jurisdic-
tional defect will not void a judgment if it is “cured,” i.e., the court obtains 
jurisdiction, by the time it enters judgment; and (2) nonjurisdictional defects 
can be overcome by countervailing prudential considerations such as econ-
omy, efficiency, and finality.161  In line with these two positions, the Court 
 
158  405 U.S. 699 (1972). 
159  Id. at 702. 
160  Lively, 456 F.3d at 941–42. 
161  See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 573–74 (2004) (stating that dis-
missal of the defendant cured the jurisdictional defect, and that the statutory defect of failing to comply 
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has reaffirmed that “if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect 
remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated.”162  Thus, the fact that a 
nonjurisdictional defect could not be raised for the first time on appeal is an 
unremarkable statement.  It does not answer the question of whether the fo-
rum defendant rule should be characterized as jurisdictional or procedural. 
B. The Other Side of the Split: The Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co. Litigation 
The case for the other side of the split, held by the Eighth Circuit and a 
few commentators, is also unpersuasive.  Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co.163 
stands against the tide in holding that the forum defendant rule is a matter 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  There, an Illinois citizen filed suit in Mis-
souri state court against a citizen of Delaware and a citizen of Missouri for 
personal injuries.164  The defendants removed on the basis of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.165  The plaintiff filed an amended complaint in federal 
court but then moved to remand to state court, asserting that the case pre-
sented no federal question.166  The district court denied the motion, holding 
removal proper under federal question jurisdiction and that, even if it were 
not, diversity jurisdiction existed.167 
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.  First, it held that federal 
question jurisdiction was lacking.168  It then addressed the defendant’s ar-
gument that diversity jurisdiction could support federal jurisdiction.  In a 
formalistic opinion, the court proceeded with the following syllogism: 
(1) federal courts require statutory authorization to exercise jurisdiction;169 
(2) original jurisdiction was not invoked because the case was filed in state 
court;170 (3) removal jurisdiction based on diversity was restricted by the fo-
rum defendant rule;171 (4) therefore, statutory jurisdiction was lacking.172  
The Eighth Circuit concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction and 
should have granted the remand motion.173 
                                                                                                                           
with the time of removal rules was overridden—rather than cured—by prudential considerations); Cat-
erpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 (1996) (“The jurisdictional defect was cured, i.e., complete diver-
sity was established before the trial commenced. . . .  [What remained was] a statutory flaw—[the] 
failure to meet the § 1441(a) requirement that the case be fit for federal adjudication at the time the re-
moval petition is filed.”).  
162  Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 76–77 (emphasis omitted). 
163  963 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1992). 
164  Id. at 1143, 1145. 
165  Id. at 1143. 
166  Id. at 1143–44. 
167  Id. at 1144. 
168  Id. at 1144–45. 
169  Id. at 1145. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 1146. 
173  Id.  
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Like Lively, Hurt also is flawed, though for different reasons.  Hurt’s 
resort to formalism stands in some tension with the Supreme Court’s more 
functional approach to characterization inquiries, as described above.174  In 
addition, the Eighth Circuit’s own precedent does not support such formal-
ism, for it holds the thirty-day time requirement for removal to be a non-
jurisdictional procedural bar.175  If Hurt’s formalist syllogism is to hold 
water on its own, it must also deem the time bar to removal to be jurisdic-
tional.  Because the Eighth Circuit is not willing to go so far, Hurt must do 
more to explain either formal justifications for the differences or abandon 
its formalism and look to a more functional approach. 
C. How the Framework Provides a More Reasoned Approach 
In short, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit persuasively 
justifies its characterization of the forum defendant rule.  To the contrary, 
their opinions approach the characterization inquiry in a misguided way.  
The Supreme Court missed the opportunity to clarify the character of the 
forum defendant rule as jurisdictional or procedural when it denied certio-
rari in Lively earlier this year.176 
A more reasoned approach would have followed the framework devel-
oped in Part III of this Article.  First, the courts should have considered 
whether Congress has specifically denoted the forum defendant rule of 
§ 1441(b) as jurisdictional.  Section 1441(b) states, in relevant part, “[a]ny 
[action other than one founded on a claim arising under federal law] shall 
be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and 
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 
brought.”177  The section does not use the term “jurisdictional” but instead 
uses the language “shall be removable only if.”  “Shall” can mean manda-
tory, but there is nothing within that phrase that indicates that it also means 
jurisdictional. 
 
174  Hurt’s syllogism depends upon a premise that removal jurisdiction is independent of and mutu-
ally exclusive of original and appellate jurisdiction, a premise in some tension with the Court’s (admit-
tedly inconsistent) conception of removal “jurisdiction” as being some form of appellate or original 
jurisdiction.  See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) (characterizing removal 
as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction); Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 287 (1871) (“We 
may doubt, with counsel, whether such removal before issue or trial can properly be called an exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction.  It may, we think, more properly be regarded as an indirect mode by which the 
Federal court acquires original jurisdiction of the causes.”); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 265 
(1879) (“Whether removal from a State to a Federal court is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, as laid 
down in Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, Sect. 1745, or an indirect mode of exercising origi-
nal jurisdiction, as intimated in Railway Company v. Whitton (13 Wall. 270), we need not now in-
quire.”); Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 452 (1943) (“The jurisdiction exercised on removal 
is original not appellate.”).  
175  See, e.g., Koehnen v. Herald Fire Ins. Co., 89 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 1996); Nolan v. Prime 
Tanning Co., 871 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir. 1989). 
176  See Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1265, 1266 (2007).   
177  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). 
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When read in conjunction with § 1441(a), however, the section may 
take on new meaning.  Section 1441(a) states: “Except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State 
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion, may be removed . . . .”178  Section 1441(b)’s forum defendant excep-
tion therefore could be read, in conjunction with its sister subsection (a), as 
an express exception to subsection (a)’s general authorization for re-
moval.179  Assuming § 1441(a) is a jurisdictional provision,180 reading 
§ 1441(b) as an express exception to § 1441(a) may turn § 1441(b) into a 
jurisdictional limitation by reference.  Whether the language is unmistaka-
bly clear enough to give rise to the presumption of jurisdiction is a question 
I do not resolve here; the point is that both the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth 
Circuit should have begun their analyses by addressing these issues and de-
termining whether or not to apply the presumption of jurisdiction. 
Second, the courts then should have turned to the function of the forum 
defendant rule.  On the one hand, the rule is not a claim-processing rule that 
directs the parties to take certain actions.  Rather, it restricts the application 
of diversity jurisdiction to removal by separating those diversity cases that 
involve a forum defendant from those that do not.  It focuses the availability 
of a federal forum in diversity cases to those removed cases that most jus-
tify the invocation of diversity jurisdiction.  This latter effect is a broader 
societal goal and has strong justification in federalism values.  These factors 
support a jurisdictional characterization of the rule. 
On the other hand, the forum defendant rule is designed to benefit an 
individual litigant: the plaintiff’s right to choose either a state or federal fo-
rum in a diversity case, though normally subject to a defendant’s ability to 
choose a federal forum, cannot be overridden by a forum defendant.  Be-
cause it is a rule that inures to the plaintiff’s benefit, it may be appropriate 
to allow the plaintiff to waive the benefit or to require the plaintiff to assert 
it within a certain time period.  The courts of appeals should have analyzed 
these factors, paying close attention to which are primary and which are 
secondary purposes, and, ultimately, should have weighed all these factors 
to determine which characterization is best supported. 
 
178  Id. § 1441(a) (emphasis added). 
179  Brian Portugal has made this point.  See Portugal, supra note 59, at 1036 (“This specific lan-
guage [of the forum defendant rule] controls the general jurisdictional language of Subsection (a).  The 
forum defendant rule falls under the specific statutory exception of Subsection (a) . . . .”).  So has Judge 
Friendly.  See Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 880, 882 n.3 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.) 
(“[T]he provision limiting removal for diversity to a non-resident defendant was in the same sentence 
authorizing removal itself, and a rather sharp scalpel was needed to dissect out one part of the sentence 
as jurisdictional and leave the other as not.”).  
180  See supra note 38.  
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Third, the courts then should have considered all of the effects of a par-
ticular characterization of the rule.181  The Ninth Circuit did analyze the ef-
fects of a procedural characterization of the rule on the plaintiff’s ultimate 
choice of forum,182 but even if that analysis avoided the problems discussed 
above, the Ninth Circuit still failed to consider other relevant effects of a 
particular characterization. 
For example, a procedural characterization would place the burden of 
raising and proving the violation on the plaintiff, the party least likely to 
know the facts relevant to making the determination of the defendant’s citi-
zenship.  And, under § 1447(c), the plaintiff would have to do so within 
thirty days of removal, usually prior to any discovery, and constrained by 
the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  That 
burden seems unwarranted and likely to result in many violations slipping 
through the cracks.  By contrast, a jurisdictional characterization would re-
quire courts to raise the issue sua sponte and would insulate the issue from 
waiver and estoppel.  A jurisdictional characterization would ensure that the 
plaintiff has adequate time to discover the relevant facts and return the case 
to her preferred state forum.  It also would deter defendants from attempting 
to remove the case in violation of the forum defendant rule in the hopes that 
the plaintiff will not suspect a violation until after the thirty-day window 
has passed.  Finally, sua sponte judicial scrutiny of defendant citizenship in 
such a situation is not anomalous; the defendant, after all, receives the bene-
fit of similar scrutiny of the plaintiff if the plaintiff originally files a diver-
sity case in federal court.  The courts of appeals should have at least 
considered these effects in their analyses. 
Finally, the courts then should have considered whether the forum de-
fendant rule has an historical pedigree of one characterization and, if not, 
whether analogous rules have been settled to be procedural or jurisdictional.  
The Supreme Court has not addressed the characterization of the forum de-
fendant rule, the circuits are split, and only one case had addressed it prior 
to 1970.  This suggests that its historical pedigree is not nearly as long nor 
as consistent as that deemed significant in Bowles.183  In addition, amend-
ments to the general removal statute have complicated any attempt to view 
its pedigree with uniformity.184  Nevertheless, the courts of appeals should 
 
181  Evan Lee suggests that all hard jurisdictional questions should be viewed in this light (and this 
light alone).  See Lee, supra note 2, at 1614 (“In a hard case, where it is unclear whether the rules de-
nominate a particular issue ‘jurisdictional,’ the court should not try to resolve the question by asking 
whether the issue is ‘in the nature of’ jurisdiction, or whether it ‘seems’ jurisdictional. . . .  Instead, the 
court should look to the effects (notice, reliance, finality, and justice) of treating that particular issue as 
if it were jurisdictional (capable of being raised for the first time on appeal, analytically prior to other 
issues in the case, and so on).”).  
182  Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2006). 
183  See cases cited supra note 61. 
184  See Lively, 456 F.3d at 939 (arguing that recent amendments to § 1447 were designed to change 
the characterization of the forum defendant rule).  
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have analyzed these issues to determine whether doctrinal consistency sup-
ports a characterization of the forum defendant rule as jurisdictional. 
Turning to cross-doctrinal analysis, although the forum defendant rule 
is rather unique, its purpose of preserving the plaintiff’s choice of forum is 
similar to the express nonremovability prescription of § 1445, which, as ex-
plained above, withholds removal from certain cases, such as those brought 
under state workmen’s compensation laws, even though they originally 
could have been filed in federal court under certain circumstances.185  If the 
courts found that § 1445 was not analogous and that, instead, the forum de-
fendant rule was unique, this factor might not have much weight.  Similarly, 
if § 1445 is analogous, but has not been settled to be procedural or jurisdic-
tional,186 this factor still might not have much weight.  At the very least, the 
courts of appeals should have considered what analogues exist and what 
their settled characterizations are. 
In short, the considerations outlined above and the framework from 
which they derive provide a sounder and more reasoned basis for analyzing 
the character of removal provisions like the forum defendant rule than do 
the approaches taken by the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit.  I did not 
say this was easy; I only suggest that my framework is a more reasoned ap-
proach.  Nor do I attempt to resolve the circuit split here and argue one way 
or another as to whether the forum defendant rule is jurisdictional or proce-
dural; I mean only to set the stage for discussion of the appropriate frame-
work courts should use to guide them through what is inherently a difficult 
and confusing process.  My purpose is to propose a framework that will 
generate more meaningful discussion about what is and is not jurisdictional, 
rather than relying on cherry-picked and perhaps carelessly used phrases 
from past Supreme Court opinions. 
V. CONCLUSION AND THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE 
My discussion of the characterization of removal provisions as juris-
dictional or procedural implicates at least two other topics.  First, the diffi-
 
185  Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351–52 (1961) (explaining that the purpose of 
§ 1445 is to preserve the plaintiff’s choice of forum (citing S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 8–9 (1958), re-
printed in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3105–06)). 
186  Such appears to be the case, although the majority view seems to be that § 1445 is nonjurisdic-
tional.  Compare Vasquez v. N. County Transit Dist., 292 F.3d 1049, 1060–62 (9th Cir. 2002) (work-
men’s compensation bar is procedural), Feichko v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 213 F.3d 586, 589–
91 (10th Cir. 2000) (FELA bar is procedural), Albarado v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 199 F.3d 762, 765–66 
(5th Cir. 1999) (same), In re Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 1197, 1201 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997) (workmen’s compen-
sation bar is procedural), Williams v. AC Spark Plugs Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 985 F.2d 783, 786–88 
(5th Cir. 1993) (same), and Carpenter v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 109 F.2d 375, 379–80 (6th Cir. 1940) 
(FELA bar is procedural), with New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1096–97, 1095 n.5 
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding § 1445 jurisdictional), and Gamble v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 486 F.2d 781, 783 
(5th Cir. 1973) (same), overruled in part by Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc., 820 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 
1987) (en banc) (relying on Grubbs). 
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culty of extending the Supreme Court’s recent jurisdictional clarifications to 
the removal context187 demonstrates that these cases likewise may be inade-
quate to resolve the jurisdictional characterization issues implicated in other 
doctrines such as prudential standing,188 appellate certification,189 exhaus-
tion,190 and the Eleventh Amendment.191  In short, there are a host of charac-
terization issues lurking in these doctrinal waters, and the current 
clarifications have not resolved them.  The framework set forth here should 
contribute to the discussion in these areas as well. 
Second, my discussion of the jurisdiction versus procedure dichotomy 
of removal should contribute, in conjunction with others’ discussions of ju-
risdiction versus merits and procedure versus merits characterization is-
sues,192 to the broader understanding of the interrelationships and 
boundaries among the trichotomy of jurisdiction, procedure, and merits. 
In this Article, I have explored the jurisdictional and procedural char-
acter of the removal statutes, the unique implications of its characterization 
for litigants and for the courts, and the lack of firm guidance for resolving 
the characterization issues that arise.  I have proposed the beginnings of a 
solution—a framework of factors that draws upon the formal and functional 
differences between jurisdiction and procedure and upon the Supreme 
Court’s recent guidance in other areas of jurisdictional characterization.  Fi-
nally, I have shown, through application to a circuit split on the forum de-
fendant rule, how the framework can provide a more reasoned basis for 
resolving removal characterization issues than do the analyses the lower 
courts have employed.  My hope is that this Article will encourage others to 
 
187  See supra text accompanying notes 76–118, 124–26. 
188  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding prudential stand-
ing requirements to be nonjurisdictional). 
189  See Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793, 796 (2007) (per curiam) (“[U]nder AEDPA, he was re-
quired to receive authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his second challenge.  Because 
he did not do so, the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.”). 
190  The Court has avoided resolving whether appellate exhaustion is jurisdictional.  See Adams v. 
Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 90 (1997); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992); Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79 (1988).  But see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980) 
(stating that the Court can decide issues that were not presented below when the respondent does not 
object, the issue was squarely presented and fully briefed, and it was an important, recurring issue). 
191  The Court has not decided whether Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction or not.  See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391–92 (1998) (“Even making the 
assumption that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction—a question 
we have not decided . . . .”).  It has, however, described the Eleventh Amendment as a “hybrid” of juris-
dictional characteristics.  Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  It “sufficiently partakes of the nature of a 
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court,” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677–
78 (1974), but it can be waived and the courts need not raise it sua sponte.  See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, it is “a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit 
on the Federal Judiciary’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 
261, 267 (1997).   
192  See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973 (2006); Lee, supra 
note 2; Wasserman, supra note 12. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 90 
join in the conversation and that the groundwork I lay here can begin to 
provide meaningful, principled, workable, clear, and consistent guidance to 
the courts. 
 
 
